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ABSTRACT
In this paper we examine the macroeconomic interdependence of Japan and
the U.S. using a medium—scale simulation model of the world economy. Our goal is
to determine how shifts in macroeconomic policies in the U.S. or Japan affect
the other country as well as the rest of the world. In particular we examine
the following three issues: (i) the likely macroeconomic ramifications for the
U.S., Europe and Japan of significant budget cuts in the U.S.; (2) the macroeco-
nomic implications of a protectionist tariff imposed by the U.S.; and (3) the









The macroeconomic linkages between the Japan and the U.S. have become a
focus of attention in the policy discussions in both countries. Largely as the
resLilt of divergent macroeconomic policies in recent years, the bilateral trade
balance between Japan and the U.S. reached an astounding $37 billion surplus for
Japan in 19814. This trade imbalance has fueled protectionist sentiment in the
U.S., with the real possibility that restrictive trade measures will be passed
by Congress this year.
Against this backdrop, it is timely to examine the macroeconomic
interdependence of the two countries, with a particular goal of determining how
shifts in macroeconomic policies in the U.S. and Japan could contribute to
continued growth, moderate inflation, and a less extreme trade imbalance between
the two countries. What are the likely ramifications for the U.S., Europe, and
Japan, of significant budget cuts in the U.S.? What happens as the U.S. economy
slows, and therefore stops being the engine of growth for the rest of the world
economy? How much would Japan have to compensate via fiscal expansion for a cut
in the U.S. budget stimulus? What would be the macroeconomic implications of a
protectionist tariff imposed by the U.S.? Finally, what is the scope for policy
coordination among the U.S., Japan, and Europe, for optimal adjustments from the
current situation?
To answer these questions, we employ a medium—scale simulation model of
the world economy, developed earlier by Sachs and McKibbin (1985). In Section
II, we offer a brief discussion of the structure and parameterization of the
model. In Section III, we explore the macroeconomic effects of various policies
undertaken by the U.S., Japan, and OECD. In Section IV we compare various
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policy scenarios for the next 5 years, and describe their macroeconomic
implications. Finally, in Section V, we present a formal analysis of the gain
to policy coordination in the current macroeconomic setting.
II. THE SIMULATION MODEL
A. Theoretical Framework
The model used in this paper was originally developed in Sachs and McKibbin
(19d5). Since the particular aim in that work was to study the effect of OECD
macroeconomic policies on developing countries, the model divided the world
economy into four regions: the U.S., the rest of the OECD (hereafter
ROECD),OPEC and the Non—oil Developing countries. In order to examine the
interdependence of the U.S. and Japan, we now expand the model to five regions
by extracting Japan from the ROECD region. A detailed description of the
theoretical framework of the model can be found in Sachs and McKibbin (1985)
and further applications can be found in Sachs (1985). The basic structure of
the model is not changed by adding Japan and so we concentrate in our discussion
on the new Japanese module of the model.
Regions are linked through trade and asset markets. Each region consumes
the outputs of other regions, and the regions accumulate assets of other regions
through current account imbalances and portfolio shifts. These transactions are
summarized in a trade matrix and an asset matrix. Below we show briefly how
these two matrices are derived.
Each region produces a single output and consumes that output as well as
the outputs of other regions. The trade matrix linking the five regions is
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given in Table 1. The notation C signifies the quantity of consumption by
country- i of the output of country j.
Table 1: Trade Matrix
Exports to:
U.S. Japan ROECD LDC OPEC
Exports from:
U.S. —- C C C C
Japan c —- c ci-'J cJ
ROECD CU0 C —— C C0
LDC C CL C°L -- CFL
OPEC C JC O C ——
Japan is assumed to have essentially the same internal macroeconomic
structure as the U.S. and ROECD. Aggregate demand is the sum of private
domestic absorption (D), exports net of imports, and government spending (Ga).
Note that private absorption expenditure includes both consumption and
investment demand. Henceforth, P, P° are the output prices of Japan and ROECD
in the local currencies (yen and ECU, respectively). E3, and E° are the nominal
exchange rates, in $/yen and $/ECTJ. We define the U.S. real exchange rate
vis—a—vis Japan and ROECD as = (PJEJ/PU) and A° = (P0E0/P'), respectively.
Aggregate demand in Japan is written as:
(i) = + + (c-+-c+C+c) — (c&°cc-iYc)/A
_L_
Private absorption is written as a linear function of GDP net of total taxes T,
the real interest rate r, and the financial wealth, H
(2) = (l-S)(Q—T) - vr ÷
Note that we will assume that Japan has a relatively high saving rate (sd)
compared with the U.S. and ROECD.
The import demands are specified as proportional to national absorption
(D÷G), and as a negative function of the relative import price:
(3) C =
=
J J J L J—l.O
CL = 6(D +G )( Ii\
J J J P J—O.2
C = cz1(D +G )(A /P
Consumer prices are a geometric weighted average of domestic and foreign
prices, with weights equal to initial expenditure shares.
pCJ = (pJ)5(p/EJ)6(p0E0/EJ)T(PL/EJ)8(PP/EJ)56T8
Let denote (P_P)/P, and denote the CPI inflation (p1_p3)/p.
We assume that the the nominal wage is predetermined in period t (that is,
contemporaneous shocks do not affect the current wage). The change in the wage
CJ J J
from period t to period t+l is a function of , and the change in
Then, by assumption of a fixed price markup over wages, we have:
J CJ J J J() Titi = ÷ +
This equation says that current domestic inflation (n1) is a function of
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cJ . . Jlagged consumer price inflation ), lagged GDP relative to potential
and the change in lagged GDP relative to potential (Q —
The money demand equation is written in standard transactions demand form:
(6) = (Q)(l÷lr
J J J J J.Here, the nominal interest equals r + where r is the real
interest rate.
Now let us move to another important feature in the structure of this
model, namely the asset holding matrix. We make strong assumptions about
portfolio holdings to simplify the model. Japanese and ROECD residents hold
U.S. assets, while U.S. residents do not hold Japanese and ROECD assets.
Mutual asset holdings between Japan and ROECD are also ignored to avoid more
complexity. Japanese residents hold: U.S. $—denominated claims on U.S. residents
(Ag), Japanese yen—denominated government bonds (Ba), and claims on the LDC's,
which are divided into yen—denominated (A) and U.S. $—denominated claims
(A). The Japanese government holds official claims on the LDC's (B) which
are yendenominated and issued at concessional rates (v). Table 2 shows the
matrix of asset holding. The wealth of Japanese residents is then
(7) H = B + ÷ AU + — A.
The change in Japanese government bonds (Ba) is related to the fiscal deficit
(DEF) as follows:
(ô) DEF = ÷ rB — T — vB
(9) B1 = (B+DEF)/(l+n)
The term (u-n) arises since B is measured relative to potential GDP, which grows
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at the rate n.
The asset matrix, in full, is given as follows ("F" signifies private
sector, and "0" signifies official, or public, sector):
Table 2. Asset Holding Matrix
Claims held by:
U.S. Japan ROECD
P 0 p 0 P 0 OPEC
Claims on:
J 0 P
U.S. P -- AU -- AU -- AU
($) ($) ($)
O BU -— -- -- —- --()
p
Japan P -- -- -- -— -- -- Aj
(yen)
O -— -- B
(yen)
p
OECD P —— -— -- —— -- —— A0
($)
O —— -— —- —— B°
(ECU)
U U J J J 0 0 P
LDC AL BL ALU AU BL AL BL AL
($) ($) ($) (yen) (yen) (ECU) (ECU) ()
Next we use asset market equilibrium conditions to determine the
exchange rate. We assume that $—denominated assets and yen—denominated assets
are imperfect substitutes in the Japanese portfolio, and that Japanese private
wealth (equation (i)) is divided between net yen assets (B+A3_A) and dollar
assets (+pu)/P, based on relative asset returns. The return differential is





U J A J J
r — r —
tote that the first expression gives the nominal interest rate differential
adjusted for nominal exchange rate changes, while the second expression shows
the real interest rate differential adjusted for real exchange rate changes (of
course, the two expressions are equivalent). The asset market equation gives
the net dollar asset demand as
(10) = + OH
O is the marginal propensity to hold $ assets out of Japanese financial wealth,
and is the degree of asset substitutability between $ and yen assets.
Let CA be the real dollar value of the Japanese current account:
(11) CA — (c°c +7C*AYc) + r1(A+A)
J J p j jjj+ r (ALJ—AJ)A + v BL&
J j
The current account is financed multilaterally, by changes in A, A,
J p jA, A and BL:
(12) CA = [(l+n)Jt+1_AJ
+ — (AJt+4Ut+BtA)]
— [(l+n)Aj+i.t_Ajt
To derive an equation for the evolution of Japanese holdings of U.S. assets (12)
is rewritten as:
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(12') (At÷cA)/(l÷n) Jt+l+ALUt+l+BJLt+l _At+1A) 
— +A+B 1+n) I 
Changes in other asset holding are determined by assuming that initial asset 
shares are maintained in the new steady state. 
The remaining part of the model contains the foreign trade and finance of 
OPEC arid the LDCs. Japan is assumed to behave in the same way as the U.S. arid 
ROECD v1s—a-vis OPEC and the LDCs in our model. We refer the reader to the 
detailed discussion in Sachs and MCKIbbjri (1985). 
B. Numerical Parameterization and Simulation Methodo1o 
The entire model is set forth ri Appendix i. In scaling the model, 
coefficients for structural equations, trade and expenditure shares, and initial 
asset stocks are required. Japan is treated as having the same basic structure 
as the U.S. and OECD in aggregate demand, pricing, and money demand. The major 
differences between them are in the composition and direction of trade and in 
portfolio preferences. Besides these differences, a few of the key assumed 
parameter values (shown Iri Appendix i) for Japan are specified differently: the 
saving rate for Japan is set higher than those of the U.S. and ROECD; the 
parameter for Substitutability of Yen and. Dollar assets is set at 1 whereas for 
ECU and Dollar assets is set at .O. This implies that ECU and Dollar assets are 
closer substitutes than Yen and Dollar assets. 
The direction and composition of trade is shown in Table 3, based on the 
1983 trade data of the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. A detailed 
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Table 3: Trade Matrix, 1983*
($ billion)
Exports to:
U.S. Japan OECD LDC OPEC
Exports from:
U.S. 23.3 102.2 58.9 i6.
(.007) (.031) (.018) (.005)
Japan 13.Ii 31.8 I3.9 19.I(.013) (.010) (.013) (.006)
OECD 109.8 19.3 —— 107.1 57.14
(.0314) (.oo6) (.033) (.018)
LDC 77.9 30.2 914.7 81..14
(.0214) (.009) (.029) (.026)
OPEC 2.7 144.2 65.8 93.1
(.008) (.0114) (.020) (.029)
*The numbers in parentheses are shares of U.S. GDP.
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description of' its derivation is provided in Sachs and McKibbin (1985).
The data on initial asset holding is reQuired when we linearize the model around
an initial equilibrium (based on 1983 data). The assumed asset matrix is shown
in Table 1. The data available for our work is rather limited and the
procedures to derive the matrix are sufficiently complicated that we only
mention key factors here. A detailed explanation about the general procedure is
described in the Sachs and McKibbin (1985) and specific details are also
available from the authors upon request. The data sources are: IMF World
Economic Outlook, World Debt Tables, World Bank; Economic Report of the
President; Japanese Ministry of Finance; the Bank of Japan; and Mattione
(1983).
III. MODEL SIMULATIONS: POLICY CHANGES AND OIL PRICE SHOCK
In this section we use the model to examine the effects of fiscal and
monetary policies in the U.S. and Japan on world macroeconomic equilibrium.
We also consider the effects of an increase in tariffs on U.S. imports of
Japanese goods and a retaliatory Japanese tariff on imports of U.S. goods.
Finally, in this section we consider the impact of an oil price shock in our
model.
Tables 5—il show the various effects of these policies. Note that in
these tables "%" signifies percentage deviation from the initial baseline; "d"
signifies the level deviation from the initial baseline; and 'T$bl" signifies
deviation from the initial baseline in 198)4 constant IJ.S. dollars.
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Table : Portfolio Matrix
(Ratio of Net Asset Holding to U.S. GDP)
Claim held by:
(end of 1983)
U.S. Japan OECD OPEC
P 0 P 0 P 0
Claim on:




.270 —— —— —— —— —— ——




.096 —— —— —— ——
P —- -- -- -- —- —-
.026
OECD
0 —— —— —— ——
.350 —— ——
LDC





A. Fiscal Expansion (u.s. and Japan)
The change in fiscal policy we consider is a sustained 1 % of GNP increase
in real government expenditure commencing in 198)4, with no initial change in
taxes. Over time taxes are raised in line with the debt service payments in
order to keep the government budget deficit constant at 1% of GNP.
The results for a U.S. fiscal expansion are shown in Table 5. The fiscal
stimulus increases U.S. GNP by 1.0% in the first year and 1.1% in the second
year. However this expansionary effect is not sustained as rising interest rates,
higher prices, and a strong dollar increasingly crowd out the fiscal stimulus.
Inflation initially falls by .3 percent in the U.S., due to the exchange rate
appreciation (against both yen and ECU) and the initial sluggishness of domestic
prices. However inflation rises in 1985 and after, as rising domestic prices
resulting from increased domestic demand (via the Phillips curve) dominate the
deflationary effects of a strong dollar.
The Japanese and HOECD economies gain in terms of GNP from the U.S. fiscal
expansion. Trade balances in both regions improve and provide a stimulus to
domestic output although the movement of capital into the U.S. (and away from
Japan and ROECD), which is attracted by rising U.S. interest rates, raises
interest rates in both Japan and ROECD. This tends to limit the output
gains.
These results may, in fact, underestimate the effects on bilateral trade
between the U.S. and Japan. We have experimented with the price elasticity of
U.S. imports from Japan and found that an increase in this elasticity from 1.5
to 2.5 enlargens the fall in U.S. net exports to Japan from $2.9b1 to *3.8b1.
Table 5: Effects of U.S. Fiscal Expansion
19814 1985 1986 1981
U.S. Economy:
GNP ($814) 1.0 1.1 0.9 0.6
GNP ($84) $bl 35.1 40.8 36.5 24.3
Inflation D —0.3 0.2 0.4 0.6
Interest rate D 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.8
Exchange rate (Ecu/$) 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.7
Trade balance ($84) $bl —15.6 —15.5 —15.9 —16.4
U.S. current a/c Cs) $bl —18.1 —18.9 —21.2 —24.0
Japanese Economy:
GNP 0.6 o.14 0.2 0.0
Inflation D 0.1 0.4 0.4 o.4
Interest rate D 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.3
Exchange rate (Yen/$) 3.6 3.3 3.1 3.0
Trade balance ($84) $bl 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.5
Japan current a/c ($) $bl 4.2 4.0 14.1 4.4
OECD Economies:
GNP 0.8 0.5 0.2 —0.2
Inflation D 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.14
Interest rate D 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.5
Trade balance ($814) $bl 114.2 13.5 13.3 13.7
OECD current a/c (5) $bl 15.9 16.5 18.8 21.6
Bilateral Trade (% U.S. GNP):
U.S. net exports to Japan —0.1 —0.1 —0.1 —0.1
($84b1) —2.9 —2.7 —2.6 —2.6
U.S. net exports to OECD —0.3 —0.3 —0.3 —0.3
($84bl) —10.4 —10.1 —10.2 —io.6
Japan net exports to OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C$84bl) —0.7 —0.7 —0.8 —0.9
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The stimulus to Japan from the U.S. fiscal expansion is therefore increased.
The case of a Japanese fiscal expansion is shown in Table 6. The Japanese
fiscal expansion has qualitatively similar effects on the Japanese economy as
the U.S. fiscal expansion has on the U.S. economy. Japanese GNP rise by 0.6% in
the first year. This is less than for the U.S. case because of the assumption
of a larger propensity to save in Japan. An interesting point to note is that
the Yen appreciates in the case of a Japanese fiscal expansion (as does the U.S.
dollar in the case of a U.S. Fiscal expansion). This comes from our assumption
of high (but not infinite) asset substituability between Japanese and U.S.
assets reflecting the recent move towards liberalization of Japanese financial
markets. The importance of this assumption will be discussed further below.
The mechanism of adjustment underlying our results is the familiar
Muridell/Flernming story: The Japanese fiscal expansion stimulates domestic demand
and drives up domestic interest rates. These higher rates attract foreign
capital. This increased demand for Japanese assets tends to appreciate the
currency even as the trade balance worsens.
Note that the rise in interest rates in the country with the fiscal
expansion is greater than in the foreign countries (i.e. an increase in the
interest diffential) despite our assumption of high asset substitutability.
This is because the fiscal expansion gives rise to expectations of future
depreciation of the currency after an initial appreciation. The interest rate
differential compensates for the anticipated future depreciation. To a smaller
extent, the higher interest rates also reflect a rising risk premium on the
assets of the country undertaking the fiscal expansion.
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Table 6: Effects of Japanese Fiscal Expansion
198)4 1985 1986 1981
U.S. Economy:
GNP ($84) 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
GNP ($84) $bl 7.5 4.6 1.6 —1.8
Inflation D 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
Interest rate D 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4
Exchange rate (Ecu/$) 0.0 —0.1 —0.1 —0.1
Trade balance ($84) $bl 2.7 2.9 3.3 3.7
U.S. current a/c ($) $bl 2.7 2.4 2.6 2.8
Japanese Economy:
GNP 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.7
Inflation D —0.3 0.0 0.2 0.4
Interest rate D 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.2
Exchange rate (Yen/$) —3.2 —2.9 —2.8 —2.7
Trade balance ($84) $bl —5.9 —5.5 —5.5 —5.9
Japan current a/c ($) $bl —6.0 —5.6 —5.9 —6.5
OECD Economies:
GNP 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
Inflation D 0.1 0.1 0.]. 0.1
Interest rate D 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Trade balance ($84) $bl 2.8 3.2 3.7 4.0
OECD current a/c ($) $bl 2.9 4.2 5.2 6.o
Bilateral Trade (% U.S. GNP):
U.S. net exports to Japan 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
($84b1) 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.4
U.S. net exports to OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0
($84b1) 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2
Japan net exports to OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
($84b1) —1.8 —1.6 —1.7 —1.8
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The cross—country effects of U.S. and Japanese fiscal policy differ mainly
because of the relative sizes of the two economies. The sheer size of the U.S.
fiscal expansion relative to the Japanese fiscal expansion (Japanese GNP is
assumed to be 35% of U.S. GNP so a fiscal shock of 1% of Japanese GNP compares
to a fiscal shock of .3% of U.S. GNP) means that the U.S. has a much larger
impact on Japanese GNP than vice versa. Japan gains .6% of GNP in the first
year following a U.S. fiscal expansion and continues to gain over the first four
years. The U.S on the other hand gains only 0.2% of GNP in the first year of a
Japanese expansion, and that effect declines rapidly in the following years.
B. Monetary Expansion (u.s. and Japan)
The results for a sustained increase in money of 1% commencing in l98L are
shown in Table I for the U.S. and Table 8 for Japan. A monetary expansion in
either Japan or the U.S. raises GNP in the originating country but has
beggar—thy-neighbour consequences for the foreign country in the first year of
the shock. A U.S. •monetary expansion raises U.S. GNP by 0.9% in the first year
although the stimulus to GNP is dissipated by the fourth year. In Japan the
inital rise in GNP from an increase in the Japanese money supply is .8% in the
first year and, as in the case for the U.S., the stimulus to GNP is eliminated
by the fourth year.
The exchange rate provides substantial insulation from the consequences of
foreign monetary shocks. In both the U.S. and Japan, the country which initiates
the monetary expansion incurs a currency depreciation. This is again the
familiar result from a simple Mundell/Flemming model where the monetary
—17—
Table 7: Effects of U.S. Monetary Expansion
1984 1985 1986 1987'
U.S. Economy:
GNP (84) 0.9 0.6 0.3 —0.1
GNP ($84) $bl 33.7' 22.5 9.6 —3.0
Inflation D 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4
Interest rate D
—0.3 —0.1 0.1 0.2
Exchange rate (Ecu/$) —0.6 —0.6 —0.6 —0.6
Trade balance ($84) $bl 0.2 —1.1 —1.8 —2.0




—0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Inflation B 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Interest rate B —0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
Exchange rate (Yen/s) —0.8 —0.6 —0.6 —0.6
Trade balance ($84) $bl —0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6
Japan current a/c ($) $bl —0.8 0.1 0.6 0.8
OECD Economies:
GNP
—0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Inflation D 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Interest rate B —0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
Trade balance ($84) $bl —1.3 0.5 1.7 2.2
OECD current a/c ($) $bl
—2.9 0.4 2.2 3.2
Bilateral Trade (% U.S. GNP):
U.S. net exports to Japan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
($84b1) 0.1 —0.2 —0.4 —0.4
U.S. net exports to OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
($84b1) 0.7 —0.4 —1.2 —1.5
Japan net exports to OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
($84b1) 0.1 0.0 0.0 —0.1
—18—
Table 8: Effects of Japanese Monetary Expansion
l981 1985 1986 1987
U.S. Economy:
GNP ($81) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
GNP ($8I-) $bl —1.7' 0.4 1.9 2.3
Inflation D 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Interest rate D 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Exchange rate (Ecu/$) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Trade balance ($81-i) $bl —0.5 —0.2 0.2 0.4
U.S. current a/c ($) $bl —0.7' —0.1 0.2
Japanese Economy:
GNP 0.8 0.I 0.2 0.0
Inflation D 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3
Interest rate ID —0.4 —0.3 —0.1 0.0
Exchange rate (Yen/$) 1.2 0.8 0.6 0.5
Trade balance (8I) $bl 0.9 0.0 —0.6 —0.9
Japan current a/c ($) $bl 1.1 0.1 —0.5 —0.9
OECD Economies:
GNP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Inflation ID 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Interest rate ID 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Trade balance ($81) $bl —0.5 —0.2 0.2 0.5
OECD current a/c ($) $bl —0.5 —o.b 0.0 0.1
Bilateral Trade (% U.S. GNP):
U.S. net exports to Japan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
($81-Lbl) —0.6 —0.1 0.2 0.1
U.S. net exports to OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
($81i.bl) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Japan net exports to OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
($8lbl) 0.4 0.1 —0.2 —0.3
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expansion reduces domestic interest rates, induces a capital outflow and hence
results in a depreciation of the currency. In our model this leads to an
inflationary impulse in the source country in the first year which is further
exacerbated in the second year when wages and domestic prices adjust to the
higher import prices and the demand stimulus. The trade balance of the country
which initiates the monetary expansion improves initially, but then worsens
after the first year, as the increased demand for imports that results from the
output expansion dominates the effects on imports and exports from the exchange
rate depreciation.
C. Effect of a General Rise in Tariffs
In this section we consider the effect of two changes in the level of
tariffs. In the first case, shown in Table 9, the U.S. is assumed to impose an
across—the—board tariff increase on imports from Japan of 30%. The tariff is
assumed to be neutral with respect to total tax revenues (i.e., tariff revenues
are redistributed to the private sector). In the second case, shown in Table
10, we assume the same U.S. policy but with a Japanese response of an
across—the—board tariff increase of 30% on all imports from the U.S.
In the case where only the U.S. increases tariffs, U.S. GNP rises in the
first three years as domestic residents substitute away from Japanese goods.
The Yen depreciates by 12.1% initially and continues to depreciate as a result
of the shift in demand. The bilateral trade balance between the U.S. and Japan
improves from the U.S. standpoint by $1l-Lbl in 198)4 and the improvement rises to
$l5.lbl by 1987. The GNP gains in the U.S. are eventually reversed. The dollar
—20—
Table 9: Effects of U.S. Tariff Increase
19814 1985 1986 1987
U.S. Economy:
GNP ($814) 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0
GNP ($814) $bl 7.6 5.8 2.2 —1.6
Inflation D 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Interest rate D 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
Exchange rate (Ecu/$) 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14
Trade balance ($814) $bl 3.8 3.1 2.14 1.9
U.S. current a/c ($) $bl 3.3 2.8 2.1 1.6
Japanese Economy:
GNP 0.3 —0.5 —1.1 —1.3
Inflation D 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.14
Interest rate D 0.2 0.7 1.0 1.2
Exchange rate (Yen/$) 12.14 12.7 13.3 114.0
Trade balance ($814) $bl —5.8 —7.0 —7.1 —6.14
Japan current a/c ($) $bl —5.5 —7.0 —.6 —7.14
OECD Economies:
GNP 0.2 0.1 0.0 —0.1
Inflation D 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0
Interest rate D 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Trade balance ($814) $bl 3.8 2.14 1.0 0.1
OECD current a/c ($) $bl 14.0 3.0 2.0 1.14
Bilateral Trade (% U.S. GNP):
U.S. net exports to Japan 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
($814bl) 114.0 114.7 15.0 15.1
U.S. net exports to OECD —0.2 —0.2 —0.2 —0.2
($814b1) —7.9 —8.2 —8.5 —8.8
Japan net exports to OECD 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
($814b1) 14.0 3.9 14.0 14.5
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appreciates relative to both the Yen and Ecu as demand pressures push up
interest rates in the U.S. This appreciation together with the increase in
import demand implies that the U.S. overall trade balance improves only by
$3.8b1 in l984, with the gain from reduced Japanese imports being substantially
offset by other bilateral deficits. The shift in U.S. demand is reflected in
GNP gains both for the U.S. and ROECD. Note however that by 1987' rising
interest rates and the strong dollar crowd out any further gains.1
Table 10 shows the case where Japan responds with a similar tariff
increase (with revenues redistributed ).The bilateral trade gains for the U.S.
in relation to Japan are reduced from $l)4bl to 6.8b1 in l984. The gains to U.S.
GNP are also reduced and turn negative by 1986. The rise in U.S. goods prices
in Japan induces Japanese residents to substitute away from the U.S. goods.
This reduces the demand for dollars and hence reduces the depreciation of the
Yen which occurs as a results of U.S. policy. The Japanese trade balance
deterioration is reversed slightly to an overall decline of $IL.Obl in 198)4.
D. Oil Price Shock
The effects of an oil price shock are shown in Table 11. Inflation rises
in each of the industrialized regions with Japan being hardest hit. The Dollar
depreciates relative to the Ecu but appreciates relative to the Yen. The Yen
depreciates relative to all currencies. The depreciated Yen coritributes to the
inflationary impulse in Japan, while the terms—of—trade loss causes an
'We also considered the case where the revenue from the tariff is used to
reduce the U.S. budget deficit. In this case U.S. GNP declines in the first
year by $1.8 bl and continues to fall as a result of the tariff. There is some
offset to this decline from gradually falling interest rates but this is
insufficient to counter the effect of the fall in demand. The U.S. trade
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Table 10: Effects of U.S. arid Japanese Tariff Increase
19814 1985 1986 1981
U.S. Economy:
GNP ($84) 0.2 0.0 —0.2 —0.4
GNP ($84) $bl 8.7 0.4 —8.4 —15.9
Inflation D 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2
Interest rate D 0.2 0.4 0.14 0.5
Exchange rate (Ecu/$) 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.6
Trade balance ($814) $bl 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3
U.S. current a/c ($) $bl 1.5 0.14 0.0 —0.2
Japanese Economy:
GNP 0.2 —0.6 —1.1 —1.3
Inflation D 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.14
Interest rate D 0.2 0.7' 1.0 1.2
Exchange rate (Yen/$) 5.1 5.2 5.5 6.0
Trade balance ($814) $bl —4.0 —14.9 —5.0
Japan current a/c ($) $bl —3.9 —14.8 —5.1 —4.9
OECD Economies:
GNP 0.2 0.1 0.0 —0.1
Inflation D 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Interest rate D 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
Trade balance ($814) $bl 3.2 3.1 2.6 1.8
OECD current a/c ($) $bl 2.9 4.5 4.5 4.0
Bilateral Trade (% U.S. GNP):
U.S. net exports to Japan 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
($84bl) 6.8 7.4 7.7' 7.7
U.S. net exports to OECD —0.1 —0.1 —0.1 —0.1
($84b1) —14.14 —4.7 —4.8 —4.6
Japan net exports to OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
($84b1) 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.3
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Table 11: Effects of OPEC Price Shock
1984 1985 1986 1987
U.S. Economy:
GNP ($84) 0.3 —0.2 —0.7 —1.2
GNP ($84) $bl ii.6 —7.0 —25.7 —46.6
Inflation D 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.7
Interest rate D 0.3 0.8 1.4 1.6
Exchange rate (Ecu/$) —0.1 —0.1 —0.2 —0.2
Trade balance ($84) $bl —5.3 —1.6 3.2 6.2




Inflation D 2.9 2.7 1.9 1.1
Interest rate D 0.0 1.5 2.6 3.3
Exchange rate (Yen/$) 2.0 1.7 2.1 2.9
Trade balance ($84) $bl —13.2 —14.1 —11.3 —7.8
Japan current a/c ($) $bl —13.1 —13.9 —11.8 —8.8
OECD Economies:
GNP 0.3 —0.7 —1.4 —1.9
Inflation D 1.3 1.4 1.1 0.7
Interest rate D 0.3 0.9 i.4 1.7
Trade balance ($84) $bl —15.9 —11.5 —2.0 5.8
OECD current a/c ($) $bl —17.8 —9.6 i.4 10.6
Bilateral Trade (% U.S. GNP):
U.S. net exports to Japan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
($84b1) —1.2 0.0 0.4 0.2
U.S. net exports to OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
($84bl) 0.4 1.0 1.4 1.5
Japan net exports to OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
($84b1) 1.1 0.3 0.0 0.3
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increasing output decline, equal to 2% of GNP in 1985 and 3.7% in 1987. The
Japanese trade balance deteriorates due to the higher oil price.
E. Simulation results compared with other Models
We now briefly describe the multipliers for monetary and fiscal policy in
the MCM (Federal Reserve Board Multicountry Model) and the EPA (Japanese
Economic Planning Agency) models. These provide a useful benchmark for
comparison with the policy multipliers from our own (IMS) model:
1. Fiscal Multipliers
The impact multipliers for GNP in the MCM and EPA models compared to our
own "IMS" model are:
EPA MCM IMS
impact 3 year impact 3 year impact 3 year
U.S. 2.0 1.93 1.5 0.83 1.0 1.0
Japan 1.1 1.5 1.2 0.6 0.7
The multipliers for GNP from these larger models are uniformly greater than we
find. A major explanation of this difference is the importance of portfolio
adjustment (including a high degree of sustitutability between U.S. and Japanese
assets) and the greater flexibility of the exchange rate in our model. The trade
balance improves by $8.3 bi and the bilateral U.S. Japan trade balance improves
by $14.8 bi. Again there is a shift out of consumption of Japanese goods in the
U.S. but the overall trade balance doesn't improve by as much because
consumption of ROECD goods rises.
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balance in the expanding country deteriorates more in our model as the larger
appreciation crowds out net exports, and this crowding out reduces the overall
stimulus from the fiscal expansion. The large difference in exchange rate
behavior is as follows. For the U.S. fiscal expansion we find a dollar
appreciation of )4.0% and for the Japanese fiscal expansion we find a Yen
appreciation of 3.2%. In the EPA and MCM models, the dollar appreciation is
much smaller at .6% and .3%, respectively. In the EPA and MCM models, the Yen
actually depreciates following a Japanese fiscal expansion by 1.5% and .3%.
2. Monetary Multipliers
A monetary expansion in the EPA model has a smaller impact on GNP than in
our model. The multipliers are conveniently summarized as follows:
EPA IMS
impact 3 year impact 3 year
U.S. O.LL 0.1 0.9 0.6
Japan 0.Ot 0.09 0.8 0.5
The results from the monetary- simulations differ far more from our model than
do the fiscal policy simulations. (The MCM does not report a directly
comparable experiment).
F. The Importance of the degree of $/Yen Substitutability
The move towards a more open financial system in Japan and the
"Internationalization" of the Yen has important implications for monetary and
fiscal policies. In this section we examine some of these implications.
In the results above we have assumed a high degree of susbstitutability
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between Japanese and U.S. assets. Table 12 illustrates the consequences for
fiscal policy if we reduce the degree of susbstitutability. The results reflect
the effect of fiscal policy in a regime such as that in Japan before 1980. In
this case the yen exchange rate depreciates by 1.7% following a Japanese fiscal
expansion. The output multipliers are also substantially larger with a rise in
GNP of 1.7% on impact. These results are much closer to those discussed above
for the MCM and EPA models.
If we take these results as the benchmark for pre—1980 and the results
presented earlier as the situation with more flexible capital markets then the
freeing up of capital flows has several important implications for Japan. A
move to a more open financial system has the effect of lowering the effect of
fiscal policy on GNP, but also reduces the inflationary consequences of a fiscal
expansion. Higher substitutability also results in a positive transmission of
the fiscal impulse to the U.S. and ROECD economies, while it means that a given
fiscal stimulus causes a much larger deterioration in the trade balance and
current account.
We can indirectly compare ours results with recent econometric estimates by
Fukao(1985). He finds that a sterilized foreign exchange intervention by the
Bank of Japan of $18 billion to support the Yen would cause the Yen to
appreciate by 3.8%. In our case of low asset substitutability we find a Yen
appreciation of 3.14% for the same amount of intervention. In contrast we find
only a .5% appreciation in our case of high asset substitutability, implying
near perfect substitutability. There are two main reasons to believe that the
econometric estimates are too low and that our assumptions may be more appropriate.
First there has been continuing liberalization of the Yen in the last five
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Table 12: Effects of Japanese Fiscal Expansion
(Low asset substitutability)
198)4 1985 1986 1981
U.S. Economy:
GNP ($84) 0.0 0.0 0.0
GNP ($84) $bl —1.3 —3.4 —1.8 1.1
Inflation D 0.0 —0.1 —0.1 —0.1
Interest rate D 0.0 —0.1 —0.2 —0.2
Exchange rate (Ecu/$) —0.1 —0.1 0.0 0.0
Trade balance ($84) $bl —0.3 —1.4 —1.7 —1.9
U.S. current a/c ($) $bl —0.2 —1.0 —0.9 —0.6
Japanese Economy:
GNP 1.7 1.9 1.5 0.9
Inflation D 0.2 1.0 1.4 1.6
Interest rate D 1.5 2.7 3.9 5.2
Exchange rate (Yen/$) 1.7 4.1 5.6 6.9
Trade balance ($84) $bl o.6 3.0 3.7
Japan current a/c ($) $bl 0.5 2.7 3.2 3.4
OECD Economies:
GNP 0.0 —0.1 0.0 0.0
Inflation D 0.0 —0.1 —0.1 —0.1
Interest rate D 0.0 —0.1 —0.2 —0.2
Trade balance ($84) $bl —0.4 —1.5 —1.8 —1.9
OECD current a/c ($) $bi —0.4 —1.7 —2.5 —2.9
Bilateral Trade (% U.S. GNP):
U.S. net exports to Japan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
($84bl) —0.6 —1.6 —1.8 —1.8
U.S. net exports to OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
($84b1) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
Japan net exports to OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
($8)4bl) 0.5 1.3 1.5 1.5
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years, so that econometric estimates of the average substitutability during the
period 1979 to 1983 (as by Fukao) will tend to underestimate the substitutabi-
lity as of 1985. Second, movements in the Yen and dollar since 1980 are much
easier to explain under the assumption of very high substitutability. We simu—
lated a U.S. fiscal expansion of 1% of GNP in the case that we call low asset
substitutability. In this case the Yen/$ exchange rate only appreciates by
1.1%. Together with the results presented in table 12 this implies that a shift
in fiscal stance by the U.S. equal to a 4% of GNP fiscal expansion, and by Japan
of 2% of GNP fiscal contraction (the approximate magnitudes since 1983), have




Bilateral Trade Balance _1.14
Yen/$ (% change) 1.0 —1.0
This compares with our results from assuming high asset substitutability:
U.S. Japan
Current Account —17.8 +28.8
Bilateral Trade Balance —16.0 +16.0
Yen/$ (% change) 20.8 —20.8
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Iv. ALTERNATIVE SCEI\IARLOS FOR TEE NEXT FIVE YEARS
In this section we use the model to generate alternative paths for major
variable in the three industrialized regions as a results of different
assumption about monetary and fiscal policy. We examine four cases:
• A path of continued large U.S. fiscal deficits with small fiscal
deficits in Japan and surpluses in ROECD;
O A gradual shift in U.S. policy tociards smaller fiscal deficits and
less tight monetary policy, with no change in Japanese or ROECD
policies;
O The same U.S. policy path but with Japan responding to offset any
harmful effects on GNP;
o The same U.S. policy path and Japanese response with the ROECD
responding to offset the decline in GNP.
Case 1. Baseline with no policy change
In this section we use the model to generate a baseline simulation for the
period from 198k to 1989. Initial conditions are supplied to the model for GNP
gap in the U.S., Japan, and the ROECD as well as initial inflation and. initial
real exchange rates and paths for fiscal policy and monetary policy. We assume
that the money supply is adjusted to maintain a given path for real interest
rates. Our other assumptions are the following:
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19814






Policy: 19814 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
U.S.
Fiscal Deficit (% GNP) 3.7 39 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9
Real Interest Rate 14.7' 5.7' 6.7' 7.7 7.7 7.7
Japan
Fiscal Deficit (% GNP) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Real Interest Rate 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0
ROECD
Fiscal Deficit (% GNP) —0.8 —0.8 —0.8 —0.8 —0.8 —0.8
Real Interest Rate 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
We make constant term adjustments to the model to improve the 19814 forecasts.
The results from 19814 to 1989 are generated by the model dynamics. Table 13
contains the results for major variables in the three industrialized regions.
Note that exchange rates are measured as percentage deviations from 1980 levels.
The sustained fiscal deficits in the U.S. imply a rising path of real interest
rates, and hence the output gap increases from 3.14% in 19814 to 5.0% in 1987.
This is accompanied by rising inflation to 1985 and a weakening dollar with
inflation rising from 3.8% in 198)4 to 14.5% in 1985, then declining to 1.6% by
1989. There is little improvement in the bilateral U.S./Japan trade position.
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Table 13: Baseline Simulation
1984 1985 1986 1981 1988 1989
U.S. Economy:
GNP gap —3.4 —4.1 —4.8 —5.0 —4.0 —1.3
GNP gap $84b1 —123.3 —151.5 —182.9 —199.6 —161.5 —120.5
Inflation 3.8 4.5 3.7' 2.8 1.9 i.6
Interest rate 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.1 8.9
Exchange rate (Ecu/$) 39.0 40.5 40.6 39.2 36.4 32.4
Trade balance $84b1 —110.0 —110.4 —103.5 —91.4 —78.2 —65.1
U.S. current a/c $84b1 —98.3 —105.2 —106.5 —102.5 —93.4 —85.2
Japanese Economy:
GNP gap —3.4 —3.0 —2.2 —1.1 —0.2 1.7'
Inflation 2.3 3.8 3.3 3.1 3.2 3.7
Interest rate 7.8 7.2 7.0 7.1 7.5 8.3
Exchange rate (Yen/$) 16.0 15.0 13.9 13.1 12.9 i4.o
Trade balance $84b1 37.9 36.1 36.8 39.5 44.1 50.0
Japan current a/c $84b1 45.7 45.7' 48.8 54.1 60.7 69.4
OECD Economies:
GNP gap —6.8 —7.3 —7.6 —7.7 —7.6 —7.5
Inflation 7.0 7.3 5.6 3.9 2.3 0.7'
Interest rate 10.4 8.7 7.0 5.4 3.8 2.2
Trade balance ($84) $84b1 35.9 27.1 22.6 20.8 21.0 22.1
OECD current a/c ($) $84b1 34.5 25.3 22.5 22.3 21.7 24.1
Bilateral Trade (% U.S. GNP):
U.S. net exports to Japan % —1.1 —1.0 —1.0 —1.0
—0.9 —0.9
$84b1 —38.5 —38.8 —38.8 —38.5 —38.5 —39.0
U.S. net exports to OECD % —1.1 —1.0 —0.8 —0.6 —0.4 —0.2
$84b1 —38.2 —35.5 —30.4 —23.3 —15.5 —7.9
Japan net exports to OECD % 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
$84b1 11.7 12.5 13.6 15.1 16.9 19.1
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Case 2. Gradual Shift in U.S. policy mix
Table 1)4 contains the results for a change in U.S. fiscal policy towards
smaller fiscal deficits and less tight monetary policy. The results are
presented as deviations from the baseline. The policy followed is a reduction
in the fiscal deficit (as a percent of GNP) and a rise in the level of nominal
money balances of the following:
19814 1985 1986 1981 1988 1989
Fiscal Deficit
—0.5% —1.0% —1.5% —2.0% —2.5% —3.0%
Money Supply 0 0.8% 1.6% 3.0% 5.0% 7.0%
with the deficit at 3.0% of GNP below the baseline from 1990 onwards and money
growing at 2% above base from 1989 onwards. This monetary policy is chosen so
as to prevent output from falling in the initial stages of the policy shift.
Notice that output in the U.S. rises in 198)4 despite the fiscal contraction and
no change in level of nominal money balances that year. This arises partly from
the forward—looking behavior in the asset markets in our model. The expected
future fiscal contraction/monetary expansion and hence expected depreciation of
the exchange rate induces a large current depreciation which stimulates demand
for U.S. goods in 19814. The trade balance improves by $214 bi which accounts for
most of the rise in GNP. The dollar continues to depreciate relative to both
the Yen and the Ecu as U.S. interest rates fall. Inflation rises by 0.5% in
198)4 due to the depreciation and rises further in 1985 as demand pressure feeds
through to prices.
Japan and the ROECD are both adversely affected by the change in U.S.
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Table 114: Effects of Gradual Change U.S. Fiscal/Monetary Mix
(Deviations from Baseline in Table 13)
19814 1985 1986 1987
U.S. Economy:
GNP ($814) 0.7 0.1
—0.5 —0.6
GNP ($814) $bl 26.3 14.8
—19.14
—214.5
Inflation D 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.6
Interest rate D 0.6 0.1
—0.5 —1.6
Exchange rate (Ecu/$)
—7.7 —9.6 —11.5 —13.6
Trade balance ($814) $bl 23.8 28.8 314.14 39.0
U.S. current a/c ($) b1 214.2 30.3 39.0 149.14
Japanese Economy:
GNP
—0.9 —0.7 —0.5 —0.3
Inflation D —0.2 —0.6
—0.7 —0.0
Interest rate D —0.8 —1.14
—1.9 —2.6
Exchange rate (Yen/$)
—7.0 —8.6 —10.3 —12.1
Trade balance ($814) $bl _14.7
—14.9 —5.2
—5.9









Interest rate D —1.1
—1.7 —2.3
—2.9
Trade balance ($814) $bl —21.3 23.14 —26.6 —31.2
OECD current a/c ($) $bl —21.5 —23.5 —29.6 —39.3
Bilateral Trade (% U.S. GNP):
U.S. net exports to Japan 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
($814bl) 14. 14.9 5.7 6.14
U.S. net exports to OECD 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6
($814b1) 16.9 19.14 22.14 25.14
Japan net exports to OECD % 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
($814b1) 1.3 1.14 1.7 2.1
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policy. The weakening of the dollar worsens the trade position of both regions
and, without any policy actions, the GNP gap increases in both these regions.
The Yen depreciates relative to the Ecu due to the differential impact of the
U.S. policy shift on trade between the regions. The impact of both the
appreciation and the decline in demand for Japanese goods is reflected in the
fall in inflation of .2% in 198)4, and a continuing fall in inflation thereafter.
Case 3. Japanese response to the shift in U.S. policy
In Table 15 we illustrate the effects of a policy response in Japan to the
change in U.S. policy. We assume that Japan follows a more expansionary fiscal
policy, increasing bond—financed government spending by 1% of GNP. We also
assume a Japanese monetary expansion of 0.5% in the level of nominal money
balances. This policy response keeps Japanese GNP approximately unchanged from
the initial baseline. This response strengthens the Yen further relative to
both the dollar and the Ecu. Inflation remains lower in Japan despite the
fiscal and monetary expansion since the strong Yen offsets the effect of rising
domestic prices on the CPI. The switch in U.S. policy has a favorable impact on
Japanese output and inflation when accompanied by expansionary policies in
Japan. Note that in the planning model used by the Ministry of Finance, the
inflationary consequences of a fiscal expansion would be larger than are reported
here. This is in part because the MOF model would predict a smaller exchange
rate appreciation.
Case )4. ROECD response to the shift in U.S. and Japanese policy
Table 16 contains the results for a change in ROECD policy given the switch
in the U.S. fiscal/monetary mix and the Japanese policy response. We assume
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Table 15: Effects of Gradual Change in U.S. Fiscal/Monetary Mix
with Japanese Policy Response
1984 1985 1986 1987
(.vjajr aIie)
U.S. Economy:
GNP ($84) 0.9 0.3
—0.5 —0.6
GNP ($84) $bl 33.2 9.5 —17.3
—25.6
Inflation D 0.6 1.0 0.9 0.7
Interest rate D 0.8 0.4 —0.2
—1.1
Exchange rate (Ecu/$)
—7.8 —9.6 —11.6 —13.6
Trade balance ($84) $bl 26.3 31.6 37.7 42.7
U.S. current a/c ($) $bl 26.7 32.7 41.5 52.2
Japanese Economy:
GNP 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.4
Inflation D
—0.5 —0.4 —0.4 —0.3





Trade balance ($84) $bl —10.1 —10.3 —11.1 —12.2




—1.1 —0.8 —0.4 0.0
Inflation D —0.2
—0.7 —0.8 —0.8
Interest rate D —1.0
—1.5 —2.0 —2.5
Trade balance ($84) $bl —18.8 —20.3 —22.7 —26.8
OECD current a/c (5) $bl —19.0 —19.4 —24.3 —32.9
Bilateral Trade (% U.S. GNP):
U.S. net exports to Japan 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
($84b1) 6.2 6.9 7.9 8.9
U.S. net exports to OECD 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6
($84b1) 17.0 19.4 22.4 25.5
Japan net exports to OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
($84bl) —0.3 —0.1 —0.1 0.1
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Table 16: Effects of Gradual Change in U.S. Fiscal/Monetary Mix
with Both Japan and ROECD Reacting
l984 1985 1986 1987
(eviatcn from baseline)
U.S. Economy:
GNP ($8b) 1.1 0.5 —O.li —0.8
GNP ($8)4) $bl o.6 18.5 —1)4.6 —30.3
Inflation D 0.1 1.2 1.2 1.0
Interest rate D 1.2 0.9 0.6 —0.3
Exchange rate (Ecu/$) —9.8 —11.2 —13.1 —15.1
Trade balance ($81t) $bl 33.2 37.5 4)4.0 49.4
U.S. current a/c ($) $bl 33.3 37.5 46.6 57.2
Japanese Economy:
GNP 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4
Inflation D —0.3 —0.2 —0.2 —0.1
Interest rate D —0.3 —0.4 —0.5 —0.7
Exchange rate (Yen/$) —9.8 —11.5 —13.3 —15.1
Trade balance ($84) $bl —7.9 —8.7 _9.)4 —10.7
Japan current a/c ($) $bl —8.0 —8.2 —9.5 —12.2
OECD Economies:
GNP 0.0 —0.3 0.0 0.1
Inflation D —0.3 —0.3 0.14 _0.14
Interest rate D 0.0 —0.6
—0.9 —1.2
Trade balance (*8)4) $bl —28.6 —26.7 —28.5 —32.7
OECD current a/c ($) $bl —28.2 —24.3 —28.3 —36.7
Bilateral Trade (% U.S. GNP):
U.S. net exports to Japan 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
($8lcbl) 6.2 7.1 8.2 9.2
U.S. net exports to OECD 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8
($8)4bl) 22.9 2)4.0 27.1 30.4
Japan net exports to OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
($8)4bi) 1.4 1.0 1.1 1.2
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that the ROECD adjusts fiscal policy such that the GNP gap returns to its value
before the U.S. policy shift. In this case we assume an increase in the ROECD
fiscal deficit of .75% of ROECD GNP in l98L and .14% thereafter.
The ROECI) fiscal expansion returns the ROECD output gap to its original
level. It also proves to be beneficial (in terms of higher GNP) to both the
U.S. and Japan as both these regions trade positions improve. As a result of
the U.S. policy shift with compensating changes in Japan and the ROECD the
dollar is depreciated by 9.8% in 198)4 and 15.1% by 1987 relative to both Yen and
Ecu. Inflation is reduced in ROECD and Japan although inflation rises in the
U.S. as it reimports some of the inflation that it exported in the years prior
to 19814 when it maintained a strong dollar. Interest rates are also reduced in
ROECD and Japan with initially higher interest rates in the U.S. The trade
imbalances of 198)4 are reduced by the policy; the U.S. trade balance is improved
by $33 bi in 198)4 and the Japanese and ROECD surpluses are reduced. The
bilateral deficit that the U.S. has with the ROECD is reduced by $22.9 bl in
198)4 although the U.S.—Japan trade imbalance only falls by $6.2 bi in 198)4.
V. POLICY COORDINATION AND OPTIMAL POLICY RESPONSE TO THE CURRENT BASELINE
In this section we use dynamic programming techniques to find the optimal
dynamic policy path for each country, assuming that policy—makers are acting to
stabilize four targets: output, inflation, the current account, and the fiscal
deficit. We compare the path of the world economy that is reached when
policy—makers in each country optimize in a coordinated fashion, with the path
which emerges from no change in current policies (i.e., our baseline path).
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The techniques used in this section are more formally developed in
Oudiz and Sachs (l981) and Sachs and McKibbin (1985).
We assume that each region i (i=U.S, Japan, ROECD) has a welfare function
of the form V1 = — 1r, CAN, DEFtI)
where is the output gap
ffC is the rate of CPI inflation
tl
CA. is the current account
1
DEF. is the fiscal deficit
1
We select a quadratic form for V. Specifically, we assume 13 = (1/1.1) and
2 c 2 2 2
V. = a .Q . + a .(rr .) + a .(CA .) + a .DEF
1 ii ti 2i ti 31 ti 1n. ti
Where 1= U.S. Japan ROECD
a1 1.0 1.0 1.1
a2 0.8 0.8
0.8
a 0.8 0.8 1.1
a 0.05 0.08 0.05
In the decentralized case (also known as the non—cooperative equilibrium or
Nash equilibrium) we assume that each region selects policies (M, G, and T) to
maximize the welfare function V, given the structure of our model and taking
the actions of other governments as given. This involves complex dynamic
programming techniques and will not be discussed any further here (see Oudiz and
Sachs (l98I-)).
In this paper we are primarily concerned with the implications of policy
coordination, so we only report the outcome of policy coordination between the
three industrialized regions in response to the conditions assumed in the base-
line. We model the coordination by assuming a central policy authority carrying
out the optimization problem outlined above. In this case the weights on each
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country in the coalition are chosen so that each country in the coalition is at
least as well off under coordination as it is under the non—cooperative regime
(not reported). The weights are the following: U.S. (.34), Japan (.21), ROECD
(.45). The policies followed are (as deviation from the baseline policies):
198)4 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
U.S.:
Fiscal Policy




from base) 1.2 3.0 4.6 6.2 6.8 7.5
Japan:
Fiscal Policy
Deficit ( GNP) 1.4 2.0 1.7' 1.4 1.1 0.8
Monetary Policy
Money (% deviation
from base) 5.9 5.3 4.9 4.0 2.6 0.5
ROECD:
Fiscal Policy
Deficit (% GNP) 0.5 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4
Monetary Policy
Money (% deviation
from base) 4.7 5.1 6.2 7.9 11.0 15.0
It is clear from this table that given our assumed utility functions there
is a generalized expansion in the world money supply. The U.S. has a fiscal
contraction whereas Japan and the ROECD have fiscal expansions relative to base.
Note that although the Japanese fiscal expansion is initially greater than the
ROECD fiscal expansion, the Japanese fiscal expansion declines over time whereas
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the ROECD fiscal expansion continues to increase. The consequences of these
policies are shown in table 17'. The output gap initially rises in the U.S. due
to the contraction in fiscal policy, though it falls relative to base from
1986 onwards. The monetary expansion in the U.S. together with the relatively
depreciated exchange rate has an inflationary consequence in the U.S. with
inflation 0.8% higher than base in 1984. The depreciated dollar means that
Japan and ROECD escape the inflationary consequences of their respective
monetary expansions although the ROECD quickly loses its deflationary gains as
the monetary expansion outweighs the effect of the currency appreciation on
domestic prices. By 1986 inflation is 1.6% higher than base in the ROECD but
this is accompanied by a reduction in the output gap of ).i.3%. The output gap
in both Japan and ROECD declines due to the monetary and fiscal expansions.
The U.S. trade deficit is reduced by $52 bi in 1984, at the expense of the
ROECD trade surplus, which falls by $48 bi in 1984. This shift is the result
of several factors. From the policy multipliers presented above we know that
a U.S. fiscal contraction of 3.1% improves the U.S. trade balance by $48 bi,
and worsens the ROECD trade account by $44 bi. An ROECD fiscal expansion of
0.5% adds a further $6 bl improvement to the U.S. trade account, and a further
$8 bl worsening of the ROECD trade account. The Japanese fiscal expansion of
1.4% also improves the U.S. and ROECD trade balances by $4 bi each. Given the
fact that monetary expansion in our model causes the expanding country's
output to rise, with little effect on the trade balance or on the output of
other countries, our model concludes that fiscal policy redistributes
bilateral trade imbalances while monetary policy expands domestic demand with
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Table 17: Outcome of Optimal Cooperative Response to Baseline
198)4 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
U.S. Economy:
GNP gap
—5.14 —14.8 —4.2 —3.8 —3.3 —3.0
GNP gap $8)4bl —195.0 —178.3 —163.2 —149.3 —136.3 —123.9
Inflation 4.6 14.6 3.9 3.3 2.8 2.14
Interest rate 6.0 5.2 14.9 14.5 39 3•3
Exchange rate (Ecu/$) 28.3 30.2 32.5 34.6 36.8 39.1
Trade balance $84b1 —57.7 —53.7 —146.6 —35.9 —2)4.3 —14.1




—2.9 —2.5 —2.1 —1.8 —1.5 —1.3
Inflation 1.8 3.3 2.7 2.3 1.9 1.5
Interest rate 1.7 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.2
Exchange rate (Yen/$) 3.6 —0.6 —4.2 —8.0 —11.6 —1)4.6
Trade balance $8)4bl 214.0 19.9 19.5 20.2 21.2 22.1
Japan current a/c $84b1 30.14 26.1 26.5 27.9 29.6 31.2
OECD Economies:
GNP gap —14.0
—3.6 —3.3 —3.0 —2.7 —2.14
Inflation 6.6 8.1 7.4 6.9 6.3 5.9
Interest rate 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.2
Trade balance ($84) $8)4bl —12.1 —19.5 —16.6 —10.1 —2.0 5.6
OECD current a/c ($) $84b1 —22.2 —35.7 —35.7 —32.2 —27.0 —22.1
Bilateral Trade (% U.S. GNP):
U.S. net exports to Japan % —0.8
—0.7 —0.7 —0.6 —0.6 —0.5
$84b1 —28.5 —27.3 —26.3 —25.0 —23.7 —22.5
U.S. net exports to OECD % —0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.14
$84bl —14.6 —0.5 2.9 7.1 11.2 14.9
Japan net exports to OECD % 0.14 0.14 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
$84b1 13.2 13.2 13.1 13.0 12.8 12.6
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little international spillover.
Policy coordination in the face of the baseline has several attractive
features. Japan has a non—inflationary reduction in the output gap and ROECD
has a large reduction in the output gap with a small rise in inflation due to
the fact that their monetary expansions are occurring in the context of
currency appreciation, with the currency appreciation coming mainly from the
U.S. fiscal contraction. The output gap in the U.S. initially rises, but is
lower during 1986—88. There is also a small rise in inflation coming from the
currency depreciation. World interest rates are lowered and the global trade
imbalances are substantially reduced. The main message of this simulation is
that given the utility functions specified above, all of the countries should
respond with a monetary expansion to the sharp budget cuts in the United States.
Also, Japan and the ROECD may- be well placed now for modest fiscal expansions of
their own.
VI. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
It is worthwhile to enumerate briefly the major results of the simulation
study. As in the paper, these may be divided into three sections: the effects
of policy changes; the projection for adjustment in the next 5 years; and the
role for policy coordination in the current economic environment.
Effects of Policy Changes:
1. For both the U.S. and Japan, a fiscal expansion raises output, worsens the
current account balance and causes an exchange rate appreciation. A shift
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in fiscal stance by the U.S. equal to )4% of GNP expansion, and by Japan of
21e of GNP contraction (the approximate magnitudes of change since 1981), are









Thus, the fiscal changes alone can explain the bulk of the worsening U.S.
current account deficit, the improvement of Japan's current account
balance, and the appreciation of the dollar relative to the Yen since 1980.
These calculations may underestimate the bilateral effects. With a





2. The liberalization of the Yen in international financial markets has
significant ramifications for the operation of fiscal policy. Comparing
the case of low asset substitutability between the Yen and $ (Table 12),
with the case of high substitutability (Table 6), we find that high
substitutability:
a) reduces the fiscal multiplier on output;
b) causes the Yen to appreciate rather than depreciate;
c) causes Japanese fiscal expansion to worsen the external balance
rather than improve the external balance;









transmitted to U.S. GNP and to the U.S. external balance.
3. Fiscal policy is positively transmitted to the other country, since it
causes a currency appreciation in the country undertaking the expansion.
4. Monetary expansion is effective in raising output in both economies. Per
unit increase of GNP, monetary policy is more inflationary than fiscal
policy, and is less adverse for the external balance. These differences
result primarily from the fact that fiscal expansion causes an exchange
rate appreciation, while monetary policy causes an exchange rate
depreciation.
5. Monetary policy changes are not transmitted significantly into foreign GNP,
since movements in the exchange rate effectively insulate the foreign
economy from the policy change.
6. A discriminatory tariff increase in the U.S. on Japanese goods would cause
a significant contraction in Japan, a sharp Yen depreciation, and a rise in
inflation in Japan. In the U.S. the policy would cause a dollar
appreciation against the Yen and the Ecu; an improvement in the trade
balance against Japan, but a significant worsening in the trade balance
against the rest of the OECD. Note that the simulation (Table 9) assumes
that the tariff change is revenue neutral. The U.S. current account
surplus would improve more if the tariff revenues were used to raise
overall taxes.
T. With retaliation from Japan (shown in Table 10), the improvement in the
U.S. current account balance from a tariff is almost completely eliminated.
8. An oil price shock is highly stagflationary throughout the OECD, with the
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most extreme effects felt in Japan. The Yen depreciates against both the $
and Ecu after an oil price increase.
Projections for Adjustment in the Next Five Years:
9. A gradual policy shift in the U.S. towards fiscal contraction and monetary
expansion (Table 14) would:
a) improve the U.S. current account by $50 billion (1984 $) by 1987;
b) raise U.S. inflation by about 3/4 of 1 percentage point;
c) reduce output abroad, in Japan and ROECD.
10. The contractionary effects of the U.S. policy shift could be offset by
modest fiscal expansion in both Japan and ROECD (shown in Table i5).
Role For Policy Coordination:
11. In comparing the optimal cooperative path for policy in each country with
the baseline, optimal policies would call for:
a) greater U.S. fiscal contraction
b) greater Japanese and ROECD fiscal expansions
c) a generalized monetary expansion







(% of own country GNP) —3.0 1.4 1.2
—46—
Appendix A
Five Region Model of the World Economy
U.S. Equations





U UU U UD = (l—s)(Q —T ) — yr + 611
5U= BU+A_A_A_A
B1 (B+DEF)/(1+n)
DEFU = GU + rUBU - VUB - TU
MU/PU =
•U U U




= (U _pU)/pUt+1 t+l t t
CU CU CU CU
=
U CU U U U





U U U P-O.2
CF = +G )(A
=
TBU = (C÷C÷c÷cg) - (cgAo÷cAL+cAP+cAJ)
Japan Equations
QJ = D + G + (c+c+C+c) —
= (l—s)(Q-T) — vr +
J J JJ J J J PH =3 +P/1 +ALJ+ALU/A _A
B÷1 = (B+DEF)/(1+n)




= .82v1 + .13r
J J J J
=









5 T T 5—0.2
CF =
TB5 AJ(U 0 L P= c5+c+c5÷c) - (c÷AOc+ALc+APc)
+1
= (A÷cA)/(1+n) - A5+A5 +B A5—A A5)+1 t LUt+1 Lt+1 t Jt+1 t
— I ( 1+n) I
JJJ JJJ JJP
CA=TB+r'(4+4u) +rAA+vABL_rAAJ
J JrU J J
= a — r - (A+1_A)/AI +
ROECD Equations
= + G° + (cg÷c÷c+c) —
= 1—s)(Q —T ) — yr +D° ( 0 0 0
H° = B° + A/A0 + - A/A0
B÷1 = (B-i-DEF)/(1+n)









CO Co CO CO
= +—'
= CO + + T(Q°—Q° )t+1 t t t—1






TB° (CU L P J / 0 0 J 0= 0÷C0÷C0+C0) — Cu+CjA +CLAL-4-CAP)/AO
= (t÷CA)I(1) — [(A0+B0) A° — (A0+B0) A°/(1+n) A + AF /(i+n)]Lt+lt L Lt — Ot+i Ot
CA° = (A_A)rU + (AA°)r° + (BA°)v0 + TB°A0
(A_Ag)/A = aEr — r — (A1-A)/A] +
—50—
LDC Equations
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Definitions
A Claims on country j held by private creditors in country i
B Claims on country j held by official creditors in country i
B1 Government debt of country i






E Exchange rate ($/yen)
G Government Expenditure
H Real Financial Wealth
i Nominal interest rate
M Nominal money supply
n Growth rate
p1 Price level of country i goods




Q Gross domestic product
r Real interest rate
T Taxes
TB Trade Balance
v Concessional real interest rate




S = 0.3 = 0.022 0.0353
S = 0.5 112 = 0.008 = 0.1145
V = 0.2 = 0.0314 = 0.092
= 0.1 = 0.0214
fl5
= 0.323
n = 0.03 a2 = 0.008 = 0.109
= 0.8 = 0.013 = 0.5
=
a14 = 0.020 = 0.5
= 0.2 = 0•0lT a1 = 0.110
t = 0.2 a6 = 0.026 a2 = 0.230
= 0.921 a7 = 0.038 a3 = 0.010
12 = 0.0314 a8 = 0.0214 a14 = 0.130
13 = 0.0214 a9 = 0.008 = 0.226
114 = 0.013 a10 = 0.022 b2 = 0.070
15 = 0.899 a11 = 0.015 w = 0.9
= 0.020 a = 14 = 0.3
17 = 0.017 a = 1 = 1.97'
= 0.026 0 = 0.5 = 1.86





Following the same procedures as Sachs and McKibbin (1985), we are
able to derive the breakdown of LDC gross debt into type of lender
(private or official) and into currency composition ($US—denominated or
Ecu, including Japanese yen). We then subtract the loans by Japan and
OPEC to the LDCs from the original values (source: IMF, Ministry of
Finance). Note that we assume that all OPEC loans are $US—denominated
and that Japanese loans are divided into three parts: yen—denominated
official loans, yen—denominated private loans, and $US—denominated pri-
vate loans. The breakdown of net debt (shown in Table Bi) is derived by
subtracting LDC reserves by currency composition from correspondent
loans (source: IMF).
OPEC ASSET HOLDING
Based on data contained in Mattione (1983), we find the breakdown of OPEC
investment divided into $_denominated in LDC, $—denominated in U.S. and
Ecu—denominated investment. In this work we substract the value of OPEC
investments in Japan (assumed yen—denominated) (source: Japanese Ministry of
Finance and others) from Ecu—denominated investment (given in Table B2).
JAPANESE ASSET HOLDING
In order to estimate the total amount of Japanese holdings of U.S. assets,
we have to pick up the major items in capital flows and calculate the existing
stock value on each item. Major items between the U.S. and Japan are securities
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investment (in particular, bonds investment) and long—term and short—term
private loans. U.S.—bond investment by Japanese institutional investors
(including pension funds and insurance companies), in particular, are expanding
rapidly. We estimate the total value of Japanese holding of U.S. assets as $35
billion in the end of 1983 (.010 as a share of U.S. GDP).
In order to find the outstanding stock of Japanese government bonds, we
take the same assumption as in the ROECD case, that the outstanding stock of
Japanese government debt is the same proportion of Japanese GDF as the U.S.
stock is of U.S. GDP.
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Table Bi: Compositicn of LDC Net Debt
Share of Variable
$US b US GDP Name






$ P 47 .013
Japan yen P 4 .001 AJ
yen 0 22 .006 B
p 41 .011 A°
OECD Ecu L
0 4i .011 B
OPEC $ P 84 .023 A
Table B2: OPEC Asset Holding
(Beginning of 1983)
Share of Variable
$US b US GDP Name
Total Net Debt 377.3 .116 ——
U.S. $ 190.1 .058
Japan yen 27.2 .008 A
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